State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution Protects against Random and Suspicionless Dog Sniffs of Storage Units by Bond, Rachel & Gaitas, Theodora
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 4 Article 11
2006
State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution
Protects against Random and Suspicionless Dog
Sniffs of Storage Units
Rachel Bond
Theodora Gaitas
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Bond, Rachel and Gaitas, Theodora (2006) "State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution Protects against Random and Suspicionless
Dog Sniffs of Storage Units," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 4, Article 11.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/11
03BOND-GAITAS.DOC 5/31/2006 1:06:31 PM 
 
1287 
STATE V. CARTER: THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION 
PROTECTS AGAINST RANDOM AND SUSPICIONLESS 
DOG SNIFFS OF STORAGE UNITS 
Rachel Bond† and Theodora Gaitas†† 
 I.   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................1288 
 II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................1289 
 A. Facts ..................................................................................1289 
 B. Procedural History .............................................................1291 
 III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION .......................................1292 
 IV.   THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ...........................................1293 
 A.  The Majority Opinion .........................................................1293 
 1. Without the Dog Sniff, the Remaining Statements in 
the Warrant Failed to Establish a Substantial Basis for 
Probable Cause .............................................................1293 
 2. A Dog Sniff Outside a Storage Unit Is Not a Search 
Under the Fourth Amendment ......................................1294 
 3. A Dog Sniff Outside a Storage Unit Is a Search Under 
the Minnesota Constitution ..........................................1296 
 4. What Level of Suspicion Is Required?...........................1297 
 B. The Special Concurrence of Justice Page .............................1299 
 C.   The Dissent of Justice Russell Anderson ..............................1300 
 V.    ANALYSIS .................................................................................1301 
 A. Expanding the Meaning of a “Search” Under Article I, 
Section 10 ..........................................................................1302 
 B.   The Nature of Privacy and the Degree of Intrusion Under 
the Fourth Amendment .......................................................1303 
 C.   The Nature of Privacy and the Degree of Intrusion Under 
Article I, Section 10............................................................1307 
 D.   Limiting the Reach of Kyllo ...............................................1308 
 E. Potential for False Alerts.....................................................1310 
 
       †   Rachel Bond is a lawyer in the General Litigation group at Faegre & 
Benson LLP.   
       ††  Theodora Gaitas is an Assistant State Public Defender.  The authors 
represented Andre Carter in his appeals to the Minnesota Court of Appeals and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
1
Bond and Gaitas: State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution Protects against Rand
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
03BOND-GAITAS.DOC 5/31/2006  1:06:31 PM 
1288 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
 F.  Limiting the “Plain Smell” Doctrine ...................................1311 
 VI.   CONCLUSION...........................................................................1313 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
 In State v. Carter,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered 
whether a drug-detection dog sniff of a fenced-in storage unit was a 
search under either the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution or article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.2  
Although the court ruled that a drug-detection dog sniff outside a 
storage unit was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, it was 
a search within the meaning of article I, section 10 of the 
Minnesota Constitution.3  To justify such a search, the police must 
“have at least [a] reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity” before conducting the sniff.4 
This Article argues that Carter is an important decision for six 
primary reasons.  First, Carter recognized that the protections 
against governmental intrusions are greater under the Minnesota 
Constitution than the protections afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution.5  Second, the court in Carter held that a dog sniff of a 
storage unit is not a search under the Fourth Amendment—an 
issue not yet decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.6  Third, Carter 
concluded that a dog sniff of a storage unit is a search under article 
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, declining to follow the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis that focuses almost exclusively on 
the nature of the item sought.7  Fourth, the court refused to extend 
Kyllo v. United States,8 which concerned the use of a thermal-imaging 
device on a home, to dog sniffs.9  Fifth, the court decided that the 
“plain smell” doctrine does not apply to odors detected by dogs.10  
Sixth, the court signaled that the potential for “false alerts” from 
drug-detection dogs is a consideration in determining the 
 
 1. 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005). 
 2. Id. at 202. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 210-11. 
 6. Id. at 208-09. 
 7. Id. at 210-11. 
 8. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 9. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 207-08. 
 10. Id. at 211. 
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constitutionality of this type of investigation.11  The decision in 
Carter sets clear limits on government intrusions—not only on the 
unrestrained and suspicionless use of drug-detecting dogs, but also 
on other emerging law enforcement investigative techniques as 
well. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
A.  Facts 
On June 10, 2002, police deployed a canine unit to conduct a 
dog sniff of a bank of storage units located inside a fenced-in St. 
Paul storage facility.12  The dog indicated the presence of a 
controlled substance in a unit rented by Andre Carter.13 
Based in large part on the dog sniff, police applied for a 
warrant to search Carter’s storage unit.14  The search warrant 
application noted that “approximately” four weeks before the dog 
sniff was conducted, a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension (“BCA”) agent, dressed in “raid gear” and staging 
for an operation near the storage facility, observed a white car drive 
into the storage facility.15  Shortly thereafter, the white car left the 
facility, then re-entered as the driver “stared” at the agent.16  Then 
the white car left the facility at the same time as a blue sports-utility 
vehicle.17  The blue vehicle was registered to Carter’s brother, 
Benjamin Carter.18  The BCA agent believed this activity to be 
suspicious, hypothesizing that the driver of the white car was 
“scouting or surveying the officers.”19 
The BCA agent informed a St. Paul police officer of his 
 
 11. Id. at 210. 
 12. Id. at 203. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  As the court noted, the search warrants themselves do not indicate 
that the vehicles entered and departed the facility at the same time.  See id. at 203 
n.1; see also Application in Support of Search Warrant (on file with authors).  
During the suppression hearing before the trial court, the affiant officer testified 
that he was told by the BCA agent that the vehicles left the facility together.  Carter, 
697 N.W.2d at 203 n.1. 
 18. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 203. 
 19. Id. 
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observations at the storage facility.20  Recognizing Benjamin 
Carter’s name from a drug-related investigation, the officer 
consulted with the manager of the storage facility who told him 
that Carter and his brother, Benjamin Carter, “each rented two 
units in the facility and sometimes visited their units several times a 
day.”21  The officer then arranged for the canine unit, “apparently 
after securing permission from the facility’s management to enter 
the fenced area immediately outside of [Carter’s] unit.”22 
In addition to the dog sniff, the BCA agent’s observations, and 
the storage facility manager’s comments, the warrant application 
alleged the following information: 
• Carter and his brother were members of a gang; 
• Carter had two prior drug convictions in 1995 and 1997; 
• Carter’s brother Benjamin had a prior drug conviction 
from 1995; 
• Carter had been convicted of possession of a pistol 
without a permit in 1995; and 
• Carter had three previous arrests, none of which 
resulted in convictions, in 1994 and 1998.23 
The warrant application did not identify the facility manager 
who assisted the officer, or specify the date on which the police 
made contact with him or her.24  The application did not indicate 
when the BCA agent made his observations at the facility.25  Nor did 
the application reveal why there was a four-week time period 
between the BCA agent’s observations and the dog sniff.26 
When the police executed the search warrant, they found two 
firearms inside Carter’s storage unit.27  There were no drugs in the 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  In fact, the record does not indicate how the police gained access to 
the facility to conduct the dog sniff.  The storage facility was a “fenced area with 
rows . . . [of] different sized garages that people may rent to store various items.”  
Transcript of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Hearing, State v. Carter (Mar. 12, 
2003) (on file with authors).  The entire storage facility was gated and locked to 
prevent entry, and required a pass or code to enter.  See id.  When the police 
executed the search warrant, they had to show the manager, who allowed the 
police to enter and directed them to Carter’s unit, the warrant in order to gain 
access into the storage area.  See id. 
 23. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 203. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 204. 
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storage unit.28 
B. Procedural History 
Carter was charged with the offense of felon in possession of a 
firearm under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivisions 
1(b) and 2, and section 609.11, subdivision 5(b).29  After pleading 
not guilty, Carter moved to suppress the evidence found pursuant 
to the search on the ground that without the results of the dog 
sniff, the application in support of the warrant failed to establish 
probable cause.30  The trial court denied Carter’s motion to 
suppress, concluding that the affidavit presented a “substantial 
basis” for probable cause to support a search warrant.31  The jury 
found Carter guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible 
person, and the trial court sentenced him to a sixty-month term of 
imprisonment.32 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a published opinion 
written by Judge Crippen,33 affirmed the district court’s denial of 
Carter’s motion to suppress and Carter’s conviction.34  Carter 
appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.35 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.36  
The court first concluded that without the results of the dog sniff, 
the warrant application failed to establish probable cause.37  Then, 
the court determined that under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a 
dog sniff outside a storage unit is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.38  But the court found that that the dog sniff was a 
search within the meaning of article I, section 10 of the Minnesota 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  The sixty-month sentence was the mandatory minimum sentence for 
the offense of felon in possession of a firearm.  MINN. STAT. § 609.11, subd. 5(b) 
(2004). 
 33. Justice Barry G. Anderson was also on the court of appeals panel.  Justice 
Anderson was subsequently appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Because 
of his participation in the court of appeals decision, he recused himself from 
consideration of the case before the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
 34. State v. Carter, 682 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 35. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 202. 
 36. Id. at 212. 
 37. Id. at 206. 
 38. Id. at 209. 
5
Bond and Gaitas: State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution Protects against Rand
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
03BOND-GAITAS.DOC 5/31/2006  1:06:31 PM 
1292 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
Constitution.39  Adopting a standard articulated by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court,40 the court held that police must have a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity before 
conducting a dog sniff and must be lawfully present in the place 
where the dog sniff occurs.41 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
In affirming Carter’s conviction, the court of appeals found no 
precedent requiring the police to have a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify a dog sniff under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The court began its analysis by noting the unique 
place dog sniffs occupy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.42  In 
United States v. Place, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a brief 
detention and dog sniff of luggage in an airport where police had a 
reasonable suspicion that the luggage contained narcotics did not 
constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.43  Citing Place, the court of appeals noted that dog 
sniffs are limited both in manner and in scope.44  Thus, the court 
concluded, because a dog sniff “discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, a contraband item,” it does not constitute a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—at least in 
public places.45 
The court of appeals acknowledged that in State v. Wiegand,46 
the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized “that there exists a 
higher reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s home than in 
public places.”47  But the court declined to extend Wiegand to dog 
sniffs of enclosed storage units, determining that Wiegand’s holding 
“is confined to a case where law enforcement attempts to expand 
the scope or duration of an investigative stop beyond the 
investigation of an equipment violation that was the cause for the 
stop.”48  Without precedent establishing a “universal requirement 
that dog sniffs be limited to cases where a reasonable, articulable 
 
 39. Id. at 211. 
 40. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 77-79 (Pa. 1987). 
 41. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212. 
 42. State v. Carter, 682 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 43. 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983). 
 44. Carter, 682 N.W.2d at 651. 
 45. Id. (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707). 
 46. 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002). 
 47. Carter, 682 N.W.2d at 651. 
 48. Id. at 652. 
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suspicion of criminal activity is shown,” the court examined 
whether Carter had a reasonable expectation of privacy “in the area 
outside his storage unit where the dog sniff occurred.”49  Finding 
that individuals with access to the storage facility were not restricted 
from the area where the dog sniff occurred, the court concluded 
that Carter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the “semi-
public area surrounding the entrance to [his] storage unit.”50 
Finally, citing Kyllo v. United States,51 the court noted the 
existence of “broader limits to the use of unique detection devices 
that reveal certain information about the contents of a structure.”52  
But under the circumstances of the Carter case, “where (1) there is 
no intrusion inside a building; (2) it is not asserted that the 
structure at issue is part of a home; and (3) no question is raised as 
to the legitimacy of the police presence near the structure,” the 
court found no authority recognizing a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.53 
IV.   THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A.   The Majority Opinion 
1. Without the Dog Sniff, the Remaining Statements in the Warrant 
Failed to Establish a Substantial Basis for Probable Cause 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered whether, 
excluding the dog sniff, the remaining allegations in the search 
warrant application established probable cause.54  If independent 
probable cause existed, the court did not need to decide the 
constitutionality of the dog sniff.55 
The court concluded that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the three factors in the warrant application other 
than the dog sniff—Carter’s criminal record, the BCA agent’s 
observations, and the manager’s statement—were insufficient to 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 52. Carter, 682 N.W.2d at 652. 
 53. Id. 
 54. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 204-06 (Minn. 2005). 
 55. Id. at 204. 
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support the issuance of the warrant for the storage unit.56  While a 
person’s criminal record may be properly considered by an issuing 
judge upon an application for a search warrant as “corroborative 
evidence,” Carter’s convictions were several years old and thus “less 
reliable in providing a ‘fair probability’ that contraband will be 
found in a place to be searched.”57 
As to the BCA agent’s observations at the storage facility, the 
court noted that the fact that the two cars entered or left the facility 
together was not part of the warrant application, and therefore 
irrelevant to the court’s analysis.58  Moreover, the fact that the 
driver was staring at the officers “can be innocently explained by 
the unusual experience of seeing police officers in ‘raid gear.’”59  
And Carter’s “mere association” with his brother, whose car the 
BCA agent observed, could not provide probable cause because 
“there was no nexus linking the suspicious vehicles or their drivers 
to any criminal activity involving [Carter].”60 
Finally, the court determined that it was unclear whether the 
manager’s statements were sufficiently fresh, given that the warrant 
application failed to state when the manager provided the 
information, not to mention the application’s failure to explain the 
four-week gap between the BCA agent’s observations and the 
request for a warrant.61  Without the results of the dog sniff, there 
was no “direct connection” to the storage unit, and thus there was 
no substantial basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant 
for Carter’s storage unit.62 
2. A Dog Sniff Outside a Storage Unit Is Not a Search Under the 
Fourth Amendment 
Next, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a dog 
sniff outside a storage unit is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.63  The court noted that “[w]hat a person knowingly 
 
 56. Id. at 206. 
 57. Id. at 205. 
 58. Id. at 205-06. 
 59. Id. at 206 n.3. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 206.  The court also observed that “there may be many legitimate 
reasons to visit a storage unit frequently.  Without more, the mere fact of frequent 
visits to a storage unit does not provide evidence of the ‘fair probability’ that 
contraband is inside.”  Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 206.  
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/11
03BOND-GAITAS.DOC 5/31/2006  1:06:31 PM 
2006] STATE V. CARTER 1295 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”64  Then, the court 
discussed Place’s holding that “because a traveler’s expectation of 
privacy in a public airport is limited, and a trained drug-detection 
dog sniff is only minimally intrusive, a dog sniff of a traveler’s 
luggage in a public place was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.”65  The distinction in Place, the court noted, was 
between a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of luggage, but not in scents detectable outside the 
luggage.66 
Regarding the intrusiveness of a dog sniff, the court again 
relied on Place’s discussion of the sui generis nature of a dog sniff 
and the observation that there is “no other investigative procedure 
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is 
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the 
procedure.”67 
The court rejected the argument that Kyllo v. United States68 
overruled the dog sniff rule established in City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond69 and Place.70  As it had previously observed in State v. 
Wiegand—a case involving a dog sniff of a car during a stop for a 
routine equipment violation—the court noted that “a thermal 
imager is ‘a piece of technical equipment much different from a 
dog.’” 71  Moreover, the court distinguished Kyllo because it involved 
the heightened expectations of a home.72  The court also cited the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Illinois v. Caballes, which 
similarly involved a dog sniff of a car.73  In Caballes, the Supreme 
Court reiterated that a dog sniff is minimally intrusive and does not 
implicate legitimate privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment 
 
 64. Id. at 207 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
 68. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that warrantless use of a thermal-imaging 
device on a home was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 69. 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic 
checkpoint is not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is 
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of 
narcotics”). 
 70. 462 U.S. at 707; see supra text accompanying note 65. 
 71. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 207 (quoting State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 130 
(Minn. 2002)). 
 72. Id. at 208. 
 73. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
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because it “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise 
would remain hidden from public view.”74  Under the Fourth 
Amendment, then, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that 
Kyllo is consistent with Place and Edmond because 
while a heat-sensory device is “capable of detecting lawful 
activity” inside a house, a dog sniff “reveals no information 
other than the location of a substance that no individual 
has any right to possess.”  The [Supreme] Court clarified 
that the relevant inquiry is whether the investigative 
device used is capable of detecting lawful as well as 
unlawful activity inside a place that otherwise carries a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.75 
While the expectation of privacy in a storage unit may be 
greater than the privacy interest in a car, the court concluded that 
the privacy interest in a storage unit is less than that for a home 
under the Fourth Amendment.76  Under Kyllo and Caballes, “the 
unit is not a place where a person seeks refuge or conducts 
frequent personal activities.”77  Thus, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded that a drug-detection dog sniff in the area 
immediately surrounding a storage unit does not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.78 
3. A Dog Sniff Outside a Storage Unit Is a Search Under the 
Minnesota Constitution 
In contrast to its Fourth Amendment analysis, the court 
concluded that the definition of a search is broader under article I, 
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.79  The court looked to 
decisions from Pennsylvania and Alaska; both jurisdictions had 
determined that a dog sniff of a storage unit, while not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, was a search under their respective 
state constitutions.80  The court noted that the Pennsylvania and 
 
 74. Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696, 707 (1983)). 
 75. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409). 
 76. Id. at 209. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Article I, section 10 is textually identical to the Fourth Amendment.  
Therefore, U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment are 
of “inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force.”  Id. at 210 
(quoting State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002)). 
 80. Id. at 210 (citing McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1991); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 78-79 (Pa. 1987)). 
10
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Alaska decisions relied in part on Professor Wayne R. LaFave, “who 
cautions against ‘totally unrestrained’ use of dogs in law 
enforcement because of the growing recognition that dogs can 
provide ‘false alerts.’”81  Considering both the privacy expectation 
in storage units and the intrusiveness of drug-detection dog sniffs 
outside a storage unit, the court concluded that “there are good 
reasons to guard against a police officer’s random use of a drug-
detection dog to sniff in the area immediately outside of a person’s 
storage unit, absent some level of suspicion of drug-related 
activity.”82 
The court determined that a person’s expectation of privacy in 
a storage unit is greater under the Minnesota Constitution than 
under the Fourth Amendment, particularly where the storage unit 
is “equivalent in size to a garage and . . . large enough to contain a 
significant number of personal items and even to conduct some 
personal activities.”83  Unlike a car or luggage, the very purpose of a 
storage unit “is to store personal effects in a fixed location.”84  A 
renter of a storage unit has no expectation of privacy in that which 
can be smelled plainly or seen from the “area immediately outside 
the unit.”85  In fact, while a renter should expect that other people 
may lawfully be present outside the unit, he “need not expect that 
police will be able to bring to that area drug-detecting dogs that 
can detect odors that no person could detect.”86 
Thus, the court concluded that a drug-detection dog outside 
Carter’s storage unit was a search under the Minnesota 
Constitution.87 
4.  What Level of Suspicion Is Required? 
To determine what level of suspicion is required before police 
may conduct a dog sniff of a storage unit, the Carter court returned 
to decisions by Pennsylvania and Alaska courts.88  Adopting the 
 
 81. Id.  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(g) (4th ed. 
2004) (discussing and compiling various cases on the use of drug-detection dogs 
and the policy rationales underlying their current treatment by those courts). 
 82. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210. 
 83. Id. at 211. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 211; see McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510-11 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1991)  (“Alaska’s more stringent protection of its citizens’ privacy interests can still 
11
Bond and Gaitas: State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution Protects against Rand
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
03BOND-GAITAS.DOC 5/31/2006  1:06:31 PM 
1298 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in pertinent part, the 
court found the reasonable suspicion standard to be a “workable 
constitutional ‘middle ground’ that balances a person’s expectation 
of privacy against the government’s interest in using dogs to detect 
illegal drugs.”89  Further embracing the Pennsylvania court’s 
rationale in Commonwealth v. Johnston, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court noted that 
[o]n the one hand, much of the law enforcement utility of 
such dogs would be lost if full blown warrant procedures 
were required before a canine sniff could be used; but on 
the other, it is our view that a free society will not remain 
free if police may use this, or any other crime detection 
device, at random and without reason.90 
Recognizing the government’s significant law-enforcement 
interest in using dogs to detect drugs, the court adopted the 
holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Johnston: 
[A] narcotics detection dog may be deployed to test for 
the presence of narcotics [in the area outside a storage 
unit] where: 
1. the police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for 
believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek 
to test; and 
2. the police are lawfully present in the place where the 
canine sniff is conducted.91 
Applying this rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded 
that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion that drugs were 
present in Carter’s storage unit and therefore the dog sniff was an 
unreasonable search under the Minnesota Constitution.92  
Accordingly, the evidence discovered as a result of the dog sniff 
and seized during the subsequent search of the storage unit was 
unlawfully obtained and should have been suppressed.93  The court 
 
be assured if the reasonable suspicion standard is applied to canine searches of 
areas of public access exterior to commercial buildings.”); Commonwealth v. 
Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa. 1987) (“[R]equiring police officers to articulate 
‘reasonable grounds’ before undertaking a dog-sniff of a storage unit presents a 
workable constitutional ‘middle ground’ that balances a person’s expectation of 
privacy against the government’s interest in using dogs to detect illegal drugs.”). 
 89. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79). 
 90. Id. (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79). 
 91. Id. at 212 (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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reversed Carter’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.94 
B. The Special Concurrence of Justice Page95 
Justice Page concurred in the result, but disagreed with the 
majority’s holding that reasonable, articulable suspicion is the 
proper standard in dog sniff cases.96  In Justice Page’s view, the 
privacy interest in a storage unit within a secure facility is greater 
than the privacy interest in an automobile, and “[g]iven this more 
prominent privacy interest, a search warrant based on anything less 
than probable cause impermissibly erodes the protections of article 
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.”97 
Justice Page articulated this position previously—and more 
fully—in his concurrence and special concurrence in State v. 
Wiegand.98  There, Justice Page first disagreed with the intrusiveness 
analysis employed by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Wiegand 
majority, concluding that “the level of intrusion resulting from a 
dog sniff is significant and requires probable cause before the 
intrusion is permissible.”99  According to Justice Page, when police 
use dogs, “they are investigating.  They are trying to find 
something.  They are seeking evidence in hidden places.”100  “The 
dog is detecting something about the person that is not otherwise 
apparent on observation.”101 
In addition, Justice Page was persuaded by Kyllo’s command 
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never 
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information 
obtained.”102  Justice Page noted that what is detected fails to make 
the search any more or less reasonable, particularly in light of 
advances in technology that enable an officer to “conduct a search 
that detects only criminal activity.”103  “[T]he intrusion is complete 
 
 94. Id. at 212. 
 95. Chief Justice Blatz joined in Justice Page’s special concurrence. 
 96. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212 (Page, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. (citing State v. Pietraszewski, 285 Minn. 212, 216, 172 N.W.2d 758, 762 
(1969)). 
 98. 645 N.W.2d 125, 137-40 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 137. 
 100. Id. (quoting United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting)). 
 101. Id. at 138. 
 102. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)). 
 103. Id. 
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regardless of what the dog smelled.”104  Moreover, the lack of a 
physical intrusion does not make the dog sniff less intrusive.105  
Neither the infrared technology in Kyllo nor the eavesdropping in 
Katz v. United States106 was permissible, even though neither involved 
a physical invasion.107  Like the sense-enhancing infrared 
technology in Kyllo, “the sense-enhancing dog-sniff, not in general 
public use, obtained information regarding the interior of the 
vehicle that could not have been obtained without physical 
intrusion—a physical intrusion that would otherwise require 
probable cause.”108 
Justice Page concluded his special concurrence in Carter by 
noting that the privacy interest in a storage unit is even greater 
than the privacy interest in an automobile.109  Given this privacy 
interest and the fact that a dog sniff is an intrusive search, Justice 
Page interpreted the Minnesota Constitution to require probable 
cause before a dog sniff could be conducted around the exterior of 
a vehicle.110 
C.  The Dissent of Justice Russell Anderson 
The lone dissenting voice was that of Justice Russell Anderson.  
Noting that there was no reason to reject the analysis set forth in 
United States v. Place, Justice Anderson argued that the use of a drug-
detecting dog “outside Carter’s storage unit did not constitute a 
search” because Carter did not have “a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the air outside the unit, in a semi-public walkway.”111  
Focusing on “[t]he area where the dog sniff was conducted,” Justice 
Anderson noted that the area was accessible to other people, that 
Carter could not restrict access to the area outside the unit, that 
Carter was only at the unit periodically, and that Carter did not live 
there.112  Dog sniffs, even fallible ones, are “a limited intrusion, 
revealing nothing else inside the structure that might implicate a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.”113 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 107. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 138 (Page, J., concurring). 
 108. Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)). 
 109. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 212 (Minn. 2005) (Page, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 213-14 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 214. 
 113. Id. 
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Justice Anderson’s dissent also relied on Caballes, noting that 
because a dog sniff is limited to detecting the “presence of 
contraband,” and “[b]ecause any interest in possessing contraband 
is not one that society considers legitimate, a sense-enhancing 
technique that only reveals the presence of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”114  Quoting Caballes, 
Justice Anderson noted: 
Critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the device 
was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case 
intimate details in a home. . . .  The legitimate expectation 
that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain 
private is categorically distinguishable from [a person’s] 
hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of 
contraband . . . .115 
Justice Anderson determined that even under the majority’s 
rationale, he would have “conclud[ed] that the police had 
reasonable suspicion to justify a dog sniff,” and would have 
affirmed Carter’s conviction.116 
V.   ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Carter is 
significant for several reasons.  First, Carter clearly held that article 
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides broader 
protection from government intrusions than does the Fourth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.117  Second, applying the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court 
found that a dog sniff of a storage unit is not a search under the 
Federal Constitution—a question that has yet to be addressed by 
the Supreme Court.118  Third, Carter rejected the analysis that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has applied to drug-detecting dog sniffs, which 
focuses on the nature of the item sought, and concluded that a dog 
sniff of a storage unit is a search under article I, section 10 of the 
Minnesota Constitution.119  Fourth, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
refused to extend the rationale of Kyllo—the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision concerning the use of thermal imaging to “see” inside a 
 
 114. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). 
 115. Id. at 214-15 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10). 
 116. Id. at 215. 
 117. Id. at 210 (majority opinion). 
 118. Id. at 207-09. 
 119. Id. at 208-11. 
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home—to dog sniffs.120  Fifth, the court clarified that the “plain 
smell” doctrine does not apply to smells that are detected by 
dogs.121  And finally, Carter recognized that the potential for false 
alerts from drug-detection dogs must be factored into the 
constitutional analysis of this type of investigation.122 
Carter is certainly instructive about how the Minnesota 
Supreme Court will approach the constitutionality of dog sniffs in 
future cases.123  But the decision will also have a broader impact.  
Carter provides a unique framework for addressing government 
intrusions under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, 
bracing Minnesota search and seizure law for emerging law 
enforcement technologies. 
A. Expanding the Meaning of a “Search” Under Article I, Section 10 
In Carter, the court took seriously its “responsibility as 
Minnesota’s highest court to independently safeguard for the 
people of Minnesota the protections embodied in [the state] 
constitution.”124  As the court noted, it is “free to offer protections 
under the Minnesota Constitution that are greater than those 
under the United States Constitution,” but will not “cavalierly” do 
so.125  While the court in several earlier decisions recognized that 
Minnesota citizens’ protections against seizures may be greater 
under the state constitution than the Federal Constitution,126  those 
 
 120. Id. at 207-08, 211. 
 121. Id. at 211. 
 122. Id. at 210. 
 123. See id. at 207-11. 
 124. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004). 
 125. Carter, 697 N.W.2d. at 210. 
 126. In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to follow the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s approach that a seizure occurs when police use physical force, 
because it represented a “sharp departure” from Minnesota’s rule that a seizure 
occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.  In re E.D.J., 502 
N.W.2d 779, 780 (Minn. 1993) (discussing California v. Hodari, 449 U.S. 621 
(1991)).  In the following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that a police 
roadblock to investigate drunk driving did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Minn. 1994) 
(discussing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)).  The court 
decided that Sitz “represent[ed] a ‘radical’ departure from the way the [Terry 
balancing] test has been and should be applied” to roadblocks.  Id. at 186.  
Instead, Ascher held that article I, section 10 required “objective individualized 
articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an 
investigative stop.”  Id. at 187.  Furthermore, in Askerooth, the court refused to 
follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that the Fourth Amendment does not 
16
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decisions did not address whether those same protections applied 
to searches.127  Carter makes clear that the Minnesota Constitution 
affords greater protections against unreasonable searches than 
does the U.S. Constitution.128 
This expansion of the meaning of a search will likely have 
important consequences outside of the dog sniff context.  
Increasingly, technology is enhancing law enforcement’s ability to 
conduct criminal investigations that involve minimal physical 
intrusions.129  Moreover, technology itself is driving the need for 
new investigative techniques, as in the case of growing Internet 
surveillance.130  Novel law enforcement technologies—from sense-
enhancing devices to computer surveillance tools—will likely 
challenge the future boundaries of a search under article I, section 
10 of the Minnesota Constitution. 
B.   The Nature of Privacy and the Degree of Intrusion Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Carter decided that a dog sniff of a storage unit is not a search 
under the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.131  Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of 
dog sniffs of storage units, its jurisprudence treats a dog sniff as a 
constitutionally unique investigative technique.132  In Place, Edmond, 
and Caballes, the Court explained that a dog sniff is minimally 
intrusive because it entails no physical invasion and it does not 
implicate a legitimate privacy interest—because a person cannot 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.133  In 
 
prohibit the warrantless arrest of a person who has committed a misdemeanor, 
concluding that “Atwater’s apparent removal of any consideration of a balancing of 
individual interests with governmental interests troubles us because this removal is 
in tension with a broad range of our precedent.”  Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 362 
(discussing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)). 
 127. See cases cited supra note 126. 
 128. Carter, 697 N.W.2d. at 210. 
 129. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo:  A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth 
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1336-57 
(2002) (discussing new law enforcement technologies). 
 130. See Geoffrey A. North, Carnivore in Cyberspace:  Extending the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act’s Framework to Carnivore Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 155, 156-68 (2002) (discussing a government-created 
surveillance device for policing internet activity). 
 131. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 202. 
 132. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 133. See cases cited supra note 132. 
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Caballes, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-
detection dog on a car stopped during a legitimate traffic stop 
because it “reveals no information other than the location of a 
substance that no individual has any right to possess.”134  Further, 
the Court squarely stated that “[o]fficial conduct that does not 
‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search 
subject to the Fourth Amendment,” and that “any interest in 
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate.’”135 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Carter was, of course, 
constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s dog sniff precedent.136  
Thus, even if the privacy interest is greater for a storage unit than it 
is for a car, the court recognized that under the Fourth 
Amendment, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection,”137  and while “a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in luggage contents . . . there is no such 
expectation in scents that may be detected at the luggage’s 
exterior.”138 
Turning to the intrusiveness of a dog sniff, the court noted the 
sui generis nature of a dog sniff as articulated in Place, commenting 
that there is “no other investigative procedure that is so limited 
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in 
the content of the information revealed by the procedure.”139  
Further, the court noted that Caballes 
emphasized its view that a drug-detection dog sniff is only 
minimally intrusive, deciding that the dog sniff of a 
 
 134. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. 
 135. Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)). 
 136. See id. at 409; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40; Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 137. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 138. Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707 n.4).  In fact, there are good reasons why 
a dog sniff of a place such as a storage unit or a home, not to mention a person, 
might raise greater constitutional concerns.  Carter’s reliance on Place and Caballes 
in this context thus seems inadequate; Place’s focus on a traveler’s limited 
expectation of privacy in luggage while in a public airport has limited applicability 
to a person’s expectation of privacy in a storage unit, particularly when Minnesota 
decisions already hold that under the Fourth Amendment a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in places such as a storage unit.  See State v. 
Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003); see also State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 
148-49 (Minn. 2002) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in an ice-fishing 
house). 
 139. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 207 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707). 
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vehicle lawfully seized on a public roadway “generally does 
not implicate legitimate privacy interests” under the 
Fourth Amendment because it “does not expose 
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain 
hidden from public view.”  The Court specifically 
determined that Kyllo is “entirely consistent” with Place.  
The Court observed that while a heat-sensory device is 
“capable of detecting lawful activity” inside a house, a dog 
sniff “reveals no information other than the location of a 
substance that no individual has any right to possess.”  
The Court clarified that the relevant inquiry is whether 
the investigative device used is capable of detecting lawful 
as well as unlawful activity inside a place that otherwise 
carries a legitimate expectation of privacy.140 
Thus, under these cases, a drug-detection dog sniff in the area 
immediately surrounding a storage unit is not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment because a storage unit “is not a place where a 
person seeks refuge or conducts frequent personal activities.”141 
As many commentators have observed, there are compelling 
reasons to criticize the Supreme Court’s approach to dog sniffs.142  
For example, since Katz v. United States, it has been the law that the 
reach of the Fourth Amendment “cannot turn upon the presence 
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure” and 
that a physical invasion is not necessary to trigger constitutional 
protections.143  The Supreme Court’s focus on the nature of the 
item sought, and its conclusion that there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in contraband, is likewise constitutionally 
unsound.144  The nature of the place to be searched is the starting 
 
 140. Id. at 208 (internal citations omitted). 
 141. Id. at 209. 
 142. See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, In the Wake of Caballes, Should We Let Sniffing 
Dogs Lie?, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2006) (criticizing the analysis of dog sniffs employed by 
the  Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 143. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
(2001) (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a 
search.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 144. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (“A search prosecuted in 
violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.”); see also 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never 
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”); 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“As a general 
proposition, using a dog to sniff for drugs is subject to the rule that the object of 
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point of the search inquiry145 and an analysis that only looks to the 
nature of the item sought is insufficient.146  It has been repeatedly 
observed that a canine sniff may be designed to detect limited 
information,147 but it is still intrusive.148  Thus, while Caballes “does 
 
enforcing criminal laws does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth 
Amendment intrusions.”). 
 145. See Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 206 (“The [Fourth Amendment] right arises only 
when a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place in question” 
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977))); see also O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Because the reasonableness 
of an expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, is 
understood to differ according to context, it is essential first to delineate the 
boundaries of the [area searched].”). 
 146. A house or a storage unit carries greater privacy expectations than does a 
car or luggage in an airport.  See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) 
(“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing 
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing 
requirements.”); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) 
(commenting that a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle is justified 
because “its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as 
the repository of personal effects” (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 
(1974))).  Similarly, a person has a lower expectation of privacy in an airport 
because at an airport, people and luggage are subject to extensive scrutiny.  See 
State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998) (discussing the extensive 
use of antihijacking surveillance and drug courier profiles at airports); see also 
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (“[D]ue in part to extensive 
antihijacking surveillance and equipment, reasonable privacy expectations are of 
significantly lesser magnitude [in a major international airport.]” (quoting Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). 
 147. But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (dog 
alerted to student who had been playing with her dog that was in heat). 
 148. Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Place explains that 
a dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what 
they could do using only their own senses.  A dog adds a new and 
previously unobtainable dimension to human perception.  The use of 
dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an individual’s 
privacy.  Such use implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as 
those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection devices. 
462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Similarly, New 
Hampshire’s highest court noted: 
Employing a trained canine to sniff a person’s private vehicle in order to 
determine whether controlled substances are concealed inside is 
certainly a search [within the terms of the New Hampshire Constitution].  
The drug detection dog discerned something not otherwise apparent to 
the officers through their own senses, aided or unaided, and advised 
them of what the dog had discovered by means the officers could 
perceive.  The very purpose of bringing the dog to the vehicle was to 
have it detect any contraband that might be hidden inside.  The sniff, in 
short, was a prying by officers into the contents of [the defendant’s] 
possession, which, concealed as they were from public view, could not 
have been evident to the officers before the prying began. 
20
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not go so far as to say explicitly that sniff searches by dogs trained 
to sense contraband always get a free pass under the Fourth 
Amendment,”149 it is difficult to envision a circumstance under 
which the Supreme Court would decide that a dog sniff—even of a 
house or a person—ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment if the dog 
sniff only detected the presence of contraband. 
C.   The Nature of Privacy and the Degree of Intrusion Under Article I, 
Section 10 
In Carter, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a strikingly 
different approach in considering the privacy interest and degree 
of intrusion under the Minnesota Constitution.  First, the court 
concluded that “a person’s expectation of privacy in a self-storage 
unit is greater for the purpose of the Minnesota Constitution than 
it has been determined to be under the Fourth Amendment,”150 
particularly for storage units like Carter’s “that are equivalent in 
size to a garage and are large enough to contain a significant 
number of personal items and even to conduct some personal 
activities.”151  Unlike a car or luggage, “the dominant purpose for 
such a unit is to store personal effects in a fixed location.”152  While 
the court cautioned that the expectation of privacy does not extend 
to objects that can be plainly viewed or smelled, it clarified that a 
smell in the area outside of a storage unit is “‘plain’ only if a person 
is capable of detecting it.”153 
The court’s analysis of the degree of intrusiveness factor is 
noteworthy—because there is almost no analysis at all.  After 
discussing the so-called “plain smell” doctrine, the court moved 
 
State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 716 (N.H. 1990); see also United States v. Thomas, 
757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he officers’ use of a dog is not a mere 
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a 
significant enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory 
instrument.”); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 672 (Colo. 2001) (rejecting the 
argument that a “dog merely enhances the olfactory senses of an officer” and 
merely sniffs the air where the officer’s “sole purpose was to conduct a drug 
investigation and to detect whether evidence hidden from view was within the 
car”); State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J., concurring) 
(concluding that dog-sniffs constitute a significant intrusion “requir[ing] probable 
cause before the intrusion is permissible”). 
 149. 543 U.S. 405, 417 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 150. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210. 
 151. Id. at 211. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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immediately to its conclusion that “the sniff of a drug-detection dog 
outside appellant’s storage unit was a search for purposes of the 
Minnesota Constitution.”154  The court did not, for purposes of its 
article I, section 10 analysis, rely on or even cite the Place, Edmond 
or Caballes decisions and their discussion of the limited 
intrusiveness of dog sniffs.  It did not rest its decision on the 
rationale of those cases that the dog detects only the presence or 
absence of contraband, and does not physically invade the area.  
Thus, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Carter majority was 
unwilling to focus its inquiry on the unlawful nature of the item 
searched. 
The court’s analysis under the Minnesota Constitution is a 
sharp break from the Supreme Court’s approach to dog sniffs.  
Under Carter, the specific context within which the dog sniff is 
conducted, and the corresponding nature of the privacy interest in 
the place being sniffed, appears to take precedence over the 
limited nature of the intrusion presented by a dog sniff. 
D.   Limiting the Reach of Kyllo 
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of a thermal-
imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home is a 
search and thus presumptively invalid if conducted without a 
warrant.155  There are persuasive arguments that under Kyllo’s 
rationale, a dog sniff is a search under the U.S. Constitution.  As 
one court noted: 
Like the heat-detecting device in Kyllo, a dog’s nose is able 
to detect the presence of drugs and explosives which 
would be unknowable without physical intrusion.  Neither 
the device in Kyollo [sic] nor a dog’s nose injects anything 
into the area of privacy; both are dependent upon 
invisible elements—molecules or heat—emanating from 
the place being investigated.156 
Just as thermal imagers “detect infrared radiation, which 
virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye,” a 
trained canine unit detects odors that cannot be smelled by a 
human nose.157  Dog sniffs, like the thermal-imaging scan, still allow 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 156. United States v. Richard, No. 01-20048-01, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14104, at 
*17 n.4. (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2001) (italics added). 
 157. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
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police to obtain information about the interior of a protected place 
“that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’”158  Finally, drug-
detecting dogs implicate Kyllo’s concern for advancing technology 
such as the “dog on a chip,”—a device that can smell microscopic 
amounts of drugs, chemical agents, or even cancerous cells.159 
The United States and the Minnesota Supreme Courts, 
however, have rejected the argument that thermal imaging and dog 
sniffs are equivalents.  It is evident that neither court is willing to 
expand the applicability of Kyllo much beyond houses.  In Caballes, 
the Supreme Court declared that its holding there—that a dog sniff 
of a car during a valid traffic stop does not implicate legitimate 
privacy interests—was “entirely consistent” with Kyllo.160  As in 
Caballes, a critical aspect of the holding in Kyllo was “the fact that 
the [thermal-imaging] device was capable of detecting lawful 
activity—in that case, intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what 
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and 
bath.’”161  The Court considered this information about lawful 
activity to be “categorically distinguishable” from “expectations 
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of [a] 
car.”162  While the Court has not considered whether Kyllo would 
change its analysis of a dog sniff of a storage unit or a house, the 
logical extension of Place and Caballes is that, notwithstanding Kyllo, 
unless the sniff can detect lawful activity, no legitimate expectation 
of privacy is infringed. 
Similarly, in the context of a storage unit, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Carter reaffirmed its position first set forth in 
Wiegand:163 Kyllo did not overrule Edmond164 or Place.165  The court 
rejected the argument that a drug-detecting dog is similar to the 
“sense-enhancement technology . . . not in general public use.”166  
 
 158. Id. at 34 (internal citation omitted). 
 159. See, e.g., CNN.com, Box to Replace Drug-Sniffing Canines?, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/ptech/11/21/dog.chip.ap (Nov. 22, 2003). 
 160. 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005). 
 161. Id. at 409-10 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38). 
 162. Id. at 410. 
 163. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125,130 (Minn. 2002). 
 164. 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic 
checkpoint is not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is 
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of 
narcotics”). 
 165. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 207-08 (Minn. 2005). 
 166. Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34). 
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Carter clearly limits Kyllo’s analysis to the home—or at least to places 
where “a person seeks refuge or conducts frequent personal 
activities,”167 which would apparently include an ice-fishing house.168  
Under this standard, however, Carter’s expectation of privacy in his 
storage unit, which as the court noted was “equivalent in size to a 
garage and [was] large enough to contain a significant number of 
personal items and even to conduct some personal activities”169 
could have implicated Kyllo.  At least for now, however, Minnesota 
courts following Carter will limit Kyllo to its facts—the use of a 
thermal-imaging or similar device that can detect lawful activity in a 
home or other places where “a person seeks refuge or conducts 
frequent personal activities.” 
E. Potential for False Alerts 
In examining the question of whether there were “significant 
reasons why the definition of a search should be broader” under 
the state constitution than under the Federal Constitution, the 
court looked to decisions of the Alaska and Pennsylvania courts for 
guidance, both of which had held that a dog sniff of a storage unit 
was a search under their respective state constitutions.170  As to 
these decisions, the court noted that “[t]hese courts relied in part 
on persuasive arguments by Professor Wayne R. LaFave, who 
cautions against ‘totally unrestrained’ use of dogs in law 
enforcement because of the growing recognition that dogs can 
provide ‘false alerts.’”171  The court’s citation of this factor—the 
potential error rates of drug-detecting dogs—from these decisions 
is significant given that the issue of “false alerts” was not explicitly 
before the court, although it may have been suggested by the fact 
 
 167. Id. at 209. 
 168. Id. (citing State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002), which held 
that warrantless entry into an ice-fishing house violated the Fourth Amendment 
because the structure is “erected and equipped to protect its occupants from the 
elements and often provid[es] eating, sleeping and other facilities”). 
 169. Id. at 210-11; see also United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 265-67 (4th Cir. 
1984) (finding defendant’s expectation of privacy in a rented storage unit 
“analogous to the expectation of privacy he had in his home” where the unit was 
located “in a fenced area,” had a “garage-like door that provided the only entrance 
to the unit” and the unit “was secured with a lock for which only Dart had a key”). 
 170. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210 (citing McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 77-79 (Pa. 
1987)). 
 171. Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(e), at 315 (2d ed. 
1987)); McGahan, 807 P.2d at 510-11 (citing 1 LAFAVE, § 2.2(f), at 372)). 
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that no drugs were found when police searched Carter’s storage 
unit the day after the dog indicated that there were drugs in the 
unit.172 
The potential for false alerts is of growing concern to courts 
and commentators.  Justice Souter’s dissent in Caballes observed 
that the “infallible dog”—the idea that canine sniffs detect nothing 
but the presence of contraband that forms the basis for the 
proposition that dog sniffs are sui generis and only present a limited 
intrusion—“is a creature of legal fiction . . . whether owing to 
errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or 
even the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine.”173  
Justice Souter argued that once this fallibility is recognized, the 
Place justification that sniffs are sui generis falls away, and the sniff 
“conducted to obtain information about the contents of private 
spaces beyond anything human senses could perceive . . . is the first 
step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’ without 
revealing contraband, just as a thermal-imaging device might do, as 
described in Kyllo.”174 
Thus, Carter signaled its concern with the potential error rate 
of dog sniffs, and an erroneous dog sniff—in particular one that 
reveals “intimate details” of a private place.175  This may be a 
significant factor for the court in future cases. 
F.  Limiting the “Plain Smell” Doctrine 
Finally, Carter makes clear that the reach of the so-called “plain 
 
 172. See Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 204. 
 173. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411-12. (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
Justice Souter cites a number of cases in support of his dissent.  See, e.g., United 
States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 488, 511 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that because as 
much as 80% of all currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert “is of 
little value”), vacated on other grounds by reh’g en banc, 357 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001) (accepting as 
reliable a dog that gave false positives between 7 and 38% of the time); United 
States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing a dog that had 
a 71% accuracy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (describing a dog that erroneously alerted four times out of nineteen 
while working for the postal service and 8% of the time over its entire career); 
United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214-17 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] substantial portion of United States currency 
. . . is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained 
canine to alert to their presence.”); Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (Ark. 2001) 
(speaking of a dog that made between ten and fifty errors). 
 174. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412-13. 
 175. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 214 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10). 
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smell” doctrine does not extend to smells detectable by dogs.  
Some courts have held that the warrant requirement exception for 
smells that an officer can plainly detect includes smells detected by 
a canine.176  This approach, however, has been criticized because in 
those cases “none of the officers involved was able to detect the 
odor of narcotics; the drugs were not in the plain smell of the 
officers.  The officers needed trained dogs to sniff out the 
contraband.”177 
The Carter majority agreed with these commentators.  The 
court stated:  
We are mindful that a person’s expectation of privacy in a 
self-storage unit does not extend to that which can be 
plainly seen or smelled from the area immediately outside 
the unit.  But we consider the smell of that area to be 
“plain” only if a person is capable of detecting it.  Stated 
another way, a renter of such a unit must expect that 
other people will lawfully be in the area outside the unit 
and will be able to smell plain odors emanating from the 
unit.  But the renter need not expect that police will be 
able to bring to that area drug-detecting dogs that can 
detect odors that no person could detect.  Such dogs do 
not enable a police officer to smell the odor, but instead, 
as in Kyllo, provide information to the police officer that  
was “previously . . . unknowable without physical 
intrusion.”178 
Thus, the court properly determined that there is nothing 
plain about a smell that cannot be detected by the human nose. 
In his dissent, Justice Russell Anderson expressed his concern 
for the ramifications of the majority’s decision on “plain smell” 
observations such as “the use of bomb-detection dogs to sniff for 
 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975) (“If 
the police officers here had detected the aroma of the drug through their own 
olfactory senses, there could be no serious contention that their sniffing in the 
area of the bags would be tantamount to an unlawful search. . . . We fail to 
understand how the detection of the odoriferous drug by the use of the sensitive 
and schooled canine senses here employed alters the situation and renders the 
police procedure constitutionally suspect.”).  See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & 
SEIZURE § 2.2(g) (4th ed. 2004). 
 177. Max A. Hansen, Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government’s 
Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 410, 423 (1976) (citing United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 327 (C.D. 
Cal. 1975)); see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.2(g) (4th ed. 2004). 
 178. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S 27, 40 
(2001)). 
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explosives” and “humans detecting the odor of a decaying body or 
a methamphetamine laboratory.”179  But this concern is misplaced.  
The majority was clear, as it was in Wiegand, that the decision was 
specifically limited to sniffs of drug-detecting dogs, and did not 
apply to bomb-detecting dogs “as to which the special needs of law 
enforcement might well be significantly greater.”180  Similarly, it 
seems clear that smells detectable by humans, whether a 
methamphetamine laboratory or a decaying body, would fall 
outside of the Carter holding—precisely because they are smells 
that can be detected by a human nose, and thus people “must 
expect that other people will lawfully be in the area outside the 
unit and will be able to smell plain odors emanating from the 
unit.”181 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Drug-detecting dog sniffs will continue to present challenges 
to courts considering their constitutionality.  In Carter, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court clearly signaled that the Minnesota 
Constitution does not allow random and unrestrained use of 
dogs,182 particularly in places that carry higher expectations of 
privacy.  The decision thus establishes important boundaries on the 




 179. Id. at 215. 
 180. Id. at 211 n.8; see also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 131 n.5 (Minn. 
2002) (distinguishing the implications of that holding for drug-sniffing dogs from 
the implications for “the accepted use of dogs to detect, for example, explosives”). 
 181. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211. 
 182. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).  When an official lacks 
either probable cause to believe a violation has occurred or other articulable basis 
upon which a reasonable suspicion may be based before effectuating a search or 
seizure, “[t]his kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the 
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of 
the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.”  Id.  
“Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in 
the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 
N.W.2d 183, 186 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
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